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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEBRA A. HODGES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940045-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. Cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and rules are 
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it allowed the jury to 
consider testimony concerning threats allegedly made against State 
witnesses when such after the fact evidence, even if true, was likely 
to prejudice the deliberation process? While "an admissibility 
decision is the sum of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed 
under a separate standard[,] . . . the correctness standard is 
applied only to the trial court's ultimate conclusion to admit or 
exclude the proffered evidence. . . . To the foregoing extent, then, 
the statement in Ramirez that admissibility is always a question of 
law is correct". State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 
1993) (construing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)); Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) ("we accord conclusions 
of law no particular deference, but review them for correctness"). 
2. Did the trial court err in not excluding the testimony 
of a State witness who had not been disclosed to the defense as a 
potential witness? "The trial court's decision that the State was 
not required by Rule 16 to give such notice before trial was a legal 
conclusion and we therefore review that conclusion for correctness." 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202, and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-412(1)(d), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David 
S. Young, presiding. On November 19, 1993, a jury convicted Debra A. 
Hodges of the above charges. (R 99-100). 
On December 20, 1993, the trial court sentenced Ms. Hodges 
to an indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison for the burglary conviction. Various court ordered 
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amounts were also imposed. (R 107). An accompanying sentence, a six 
month term for the misdemeanor conviction, ran concurrently with the 
indeterminate sentence. (R 108). 
Other facts, including those procedurally pertinent to the 
issue involving the prosecution's surprise witness, Ruth Ann Smith, 
are recounted in full below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 14, 1993, the State filed an Information against 
Debra Hodges which charged her with burglary and theft and which 
based its allegations on the information provided by four witnesses 
(Edward Johnson, Teresa Chistensen, Ken White and Gil Arenaz). 
(R 7-8). On June 16, 1993, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
("LDA") entered an appearance of counsel and formally requested the 
State to provide the defendant with "A list of all the witnesses that 
the State intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, 
their addresses, telephone numbers and criminal records." 
(R 17-20). Ruth Ann Smith was not one of the witnesses listed by the 
State. 
On July 13, 1993, the State called three witnesses (Edward 
Johnson, Teresa Christensen, and Kenneth D. White) during the 
preliminary hearing for the case at bar. (R 3). Ruth Ann Smith was 
not included. 
On September 8, 1993, the State wrote defense counsel to 
inform him of four additional trial witnesses: William Connors, Leo 
Pacheco, Dr. Mark Davis, and Dr. LeRoy Anderson. No mention was made 
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of Ruth Ann Smith. 
On the morning of trial, November 18, 1993, the State for 
the first time announced its intention of calling Ruth Ann Smith as a 
witness, notwithstanding its "acknowledge[ment] that [Ms. Smith's] 
name was not furnished to defense counsel prior to coming to trial 
today because we didn't have it." (R 130, 139). However, the trial 
court alluded to the claim that Ms. Smith was "referred to by first 
name only in the report of June 11th, 1993 by Detective Arenaz in the 
second paragraph of the first page . . . " (R 137, 139-40). 
"The court [went on to] find that there was insufficient 
information disclosing the identity of Ruth Ann Smith to the defense 
in the report as to only her first name and, thus, the State's motion 
to include Ruth Ann Smith as a potential witness in this case is 
denied and she will not be allowed to testify." (R 143). Irrelevant 
to the court was the State's argument that, one, Ms. Smith had only 
"called Detective Arenaz this morning [November 18]", and two, other 
State witnesses were unavailable at the time of trial. (R 136, 140, 
143) . 
After the State presented its case-in-chief, the court 
reversed its own pretrial ruling and allowed Ruth Smith to testify. 
(R 227). Ms. Smith's testimony, however, revealed contradiction's in 
the State's claim that it had "just [been] informed during the break 
after the selection of the jury and before the court began reading 
instructions to the jury that a Ruth Ann Smith has come forward and 
offered to be a witness." (R 136). Contrary to the State's 
representations, Ruth Ann Smith's presence at trial resulted from a 
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subpoena — a process which did not occur on its own and one which 
began well before jury selection. (R 256, 261). While the State may 
not have known "of her [Smith's] willingness to testify until [the] 
morning [of trial,]" (R 240) (emphasis added), the State had 
nonetheless issued a subpoena beforehand. Counsel for Ms. Hodges did 
not receive appropriate notice prior to the start of trial. 
Trial testimony revealed that during the early morning hours 
of June 3, 1993, Edward "Pete" Johnson awoke to find an intruder in 
his darkened apartment. (R 152, 215). At the time of the intrusion, 
Johnson was not wearing his prescription glasses. (R 152, 163, 
169-70). The apartment lights were off and the intruder's head was 
covered by a nylon stocking. (R 152, 163, 169-70). 
A struggle ensued, during which the intruder apparently said 
"something but I [Johnson] couldn't understand it. It sounded like 
Chinese or something." (R 164-65). Johnson did not recognize the 
voice. (R 165). While Johnson managed to remove the stocking, he 
conceded that the person may have been someone other than Debra 
Hodges (a "white" female resident in the same apartment complex). 
(R 151, 167); State's Exhibit 1-S. The person seen leaving Johnson's 
apartment was described as being 5'9" tall. (R 288). Debra Hodges 
is 5'4"; another resident in the complex, Ruth Ann Smith, is 5'8" 
tall and admitted that she was involved. (R 280). Approximately $20 
was taken from Johnson's wallet. (R 301). 
Ruth Ann Smith testified that there was a stocking, "but 
mine came — I tried to put one on but it didn't stay on. It came 
off. I didn't have one at the time." (R 281). Smith attempted to 
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shift blame for the incident from herself to Ms. Hodges. 
Ruth Ann Smith is an addict, an alcoholic who had been 
drinking and using drugs (valium, cocaine, alcohol) at the time in 
question. (R 258, 260). Smith claimed that using drugs had not 
affected her senses or her ability to perceive the incident. 
(R 258). She also testified that she did not confess earlier 
because she "didn't want to go to jail." (R 257, 262). At trial, 
though, Smith claimed that her fear of jail was now outweighed by 
her "[guilt for] what happened." (R 257, 259, 262). Smith also has 
another charge pending for a different offense and has been booked 
into jail on three separate occasions. (R 257, 278). 
Two of the State's other witnesses, Kenneth White and 
Teresa Christensen, testified about matters which had been 
previously deemed inadmissible. (R 132). Prior to trial, counsel 
for Ms. Hodges sought to prevent the State from "attempt[ing] to 
elicit [sic] testimony regarding some phone call made subsequent to 
the conduct alleged in the information[.]" (R 130). "There was no 
identification of Ms. Hodges in the phone call . . . " and the 
alleged conversation was considered "more prejudicial than 
probative." (R 130). According to State witnesses, in phone 
conversations made after the incident but before trial, Hodges had 
threatened them and told them not to testify. (R 130). 
At trial, Kenneth White testified that he had witnessed 
part of the incident involving Edward Johnson and the intruder. 
(R 174-79). Mr. White and Mr. Johnson both suffer from 
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schizophrenic disorders. (R 158-59, 187). Ken White said the 
intruder was Debra Hodges. (R 177). 
Mr. White also claimed that "about four or five days 
afterwards[,]" Hodges called him and threatened him with "You're 
dead, you're dead." (R 180, 186). The State further emphasized the 
alleged threatening conduct by calling Teresa Christensen, an 
apartment resident who had seen nothing during the time in 
question. (R 201). 
However, Ms. Christensen claimed that "a day or two after" 
the incident she heard Debra Hodges admit her involvement. (R 202). 
Then, "a week or two" later, Christensen testified that Hodges had 
threatened her at a bar. (R 204). According to Christensen, "she 
[Hodges] had been watching me all night, kind of giving me, you 
know, we had looks, and then after all my friends left she came over 
to the table and she said that if I were to testify against her she 
knew of some man, somebody that would come and I would be dead. I 
would be killed. If I testified against her." (R 204). 
Christensen also stated that "she [Hodges] just walked away. Says, 
you're dead, and walked away." (R 204-05). 
Based upon the evidence presented, the jury convicted Debra 
Hodges of burglary and theft. (R 310-11). The alleged threats 
apparently influenced the presiding judge as well since at the close 
of trial the court denied Ms. Hodges' request for continued release 
pending sentencing. (R 326). "The court does believe that the 
defendant has been very inappropriate in contacting other witnesses. 
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. . . Those calls to the other witnesses involved threats to their 
lives and I simply cannot tolerate that." (R 326). Ms. Hodges then 
filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it allowed the State to present 
testimony concerning alleged threats made by Ms. Hodges against its 
witnesses. Such allegations have no legal relevance to Ms. Hodges 
mental state at the time of the incident and even assuming, 
arguendof that such after-the-fact threats were made, the 
prejudicial nature of death threats far outweigh any probativeness. 
Inflammatory comments tend to confuse the jury or lead them to base 
their determinations on circumstances other than the pertinent 
evidence. 
The trial court also erred when it allowed the State to 
call Ruth Ann Smith, a witness used without prior notification to 
the defense and a last minute insertion which required changes in 
Ms. Hodges' theory of the case. The court also erroneously denied 
Ms. Hodges' request for a continuance (for purposes of uncovering 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED TESTIMONY 
REGARDING ALLEGED THREATS MADE AGAINST STATE WITNESSES 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, . . . " 
Utah R. Evid. 403 reprinted in State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 
(Utah 1989). In Maurer, our supreme court cited with approval the 
principles underlying State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 
(1972), an opinion with facts virtually identical to the case at 
bar. Maurer and Marler both involved admissibility decisions 
wherein the trial court exceeded the "bounds of the 'reasonable or 
permissive range' of discretion." Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. 
As in Ms. Debra Hodges situation, the defendant in State v. 
Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 (1972), objected to testimony 
concerning alleged threats made against State witnesses. Compare 
(R 130, 180, 183, 186), with Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1280. Dennis 
Marlar apparently had telephoned a witness and told him not to 
testify. Over objection from Marlar's counsel, the trial court 
allowed the jury to consider the following conversation: 
Q. [By the State] Did he [Marlar] ever call you at 
2:30 in the morning on one occasion? 
A. [State witness] Yes, sir. 
Q. You remember what the substance of that 
conversation was? 
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A. Essentially that the manner in which the parties 
involved were going to testify and that I responded to 
saying that 'that just however they testified would 
have to be the way they testified,' and I said that 'I 
didn't want him calling my home anymore,' and he said 
profanity and then 'I'll put you in the morgue,' 
Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1280 (emphasis added). 
This conversation, the State argued, was legally relevant 
in two respects. "[F]irst, that the evidence tends to establish the 
then-existing state of mind of appellant or his intent in committing 
the alleged assault; and second, that the subject matter of the 
phone calls and the consequent threatening gesture by the caller 
(I'll put you in the morgue") connotes an implied admission of guilt 
or consciousness of a weak case." Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1282. The 
Marlar Court found "neither of these propositions persuasive." Id. 
The crucial issue on relevancy, and hence the 
admissibility of threats, is the sufficiency of the 
threat as indicative of the requisite state of mind. 
The statement "I'll put you in the morgue" (even if 
made by appellant) does not, in itself, tend to 
establish an intent or state of mind at the time of 
the commission of the criminal offense. The 
statement, at most, was an opprobrious remark 
illustrating the caller's malevolent attitude toward 
the witness Higgins at the time the statement was made. 
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Furthermore, "[e]ven if we could glean some probative value 
from the telephone conversation evidence [e.g. implied admission of 
guilt], it would be so slight that its admittance into evidence 
would not be justified in light of the possible prejudice to 
appellant." Id. "[B]ecause of the inflammatory effect which the 
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threat might have on the jury, it should not have been admitted. 
[Since] such inflammatory evidence . . . 'serves only to inflame the 
minds and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant' it 
is well settled that its admission is reversible error." Marlar, 
498 P.2d at 1283 (citations omitted). "The fact that there may have 
been adequate independent evidence to convict the accused apart from 
the inflammatory evidence provides no salvation to the 
prosecution." Id. 
During Ms. Hodges' trial, the court allowed even greater 
prejudicial evidence to mislead the jury. Over objection from 
defense counsel, (R 183-84), the court allowed Teresa Christensen to 
testify about a threat allegedly made by Hodges at a bar. (R 204). 
According to Christensen, "she [Hodges] had been watching me all 
night, kind of giving me, you know, we had looks, and then after all 
my friends left she came over to the table and she said that if I 
were to testify against her she knew of some man, somebody that 
would come and I would be dead. I would be killed. If I testified 
against her." (R 204). Christensen also claimed that "she [Hodges] 
just walked away. Says, you're dead, and walked away." 
(R 204-05). 
Another State witness, Kenneth White, made similar 
allegations over objections from Ms. Hodges' counsel. (R 183-84). 
White told the jury that "about four or five days [after the June 3 
incident,]" Hodges called him and threatened him with "You're dead, 
you're dead." (R 180, 186). 
- 11 -
The trial court, however, erroneously linked the 
allegations concerning Ms. Hodges' "after-the-fact" conduct with 
evidence bearing upon the "then-existing" mental state: 
if the defendant makes threatening phone calls in 
relation to one of the witnesses that's testifying in 
this case, that is in relation to this offense. What 
I'm thinking of in your [Ms. Hodges] motion in limine, 
I'm thinking of an unrelated act like, perhaps, a 
forgery in some other year or some other kind of act, 
but anything that's related to this offense, 
threatening phone calls, if she [Hodges] made them, 
would go to the facts of this case and would be 
measured and judged by the jury as to their weight and 
their reliability by the jury determining whether to 
believe the witness. That invades exactly the 
prerogative that I think is preserved for the jury. 
(R 183-84) (emphasis added); accord (R 256). 
Contrary to the court's beliefs, what Ms. Hodges did or did 
not say does "not in itself tend to establish an intent or state of 
mind at the time of the commission of the criminal offense." State 
v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) 
(construing State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 (1972)). 
"The statement, at most was an opprobrious remark illustrating the 
caller's malevolent attitude towards the witness Higgins at the time 
the statement was made [i.e. after the incident]." Marlar, 498 P.2d 
at 1283 (emphasis added) quoted in Maurer, 770 P.2d at 986. 
Threatening phone calls, even if true, have no legal relevance in 
regards to the elements of the crime. 
Moreover, as recognized in Marlar, "[e]ven if we could 
glean some probative value from the telephone conversation evidence, 
it would be so slight that its admittance into evidence would not be 
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justified in light of the possible prejudice to appellant." 498 
P.2d at 1283. The prejudicial impact of the threats were no better 
reflected than through the lower court's own statements. 
In ruling that Ms. Hodges could not remain on continued 
release pending sentencing, the court concluded, "The court does 
believe that the defendant has been very inappropriate in contacting 
other witnesses. . . . Those calls to the other witnesses involved 
threats to their lives and I simply cannot tolerate that." 
(R 326). The jury's judgment may have been similarly swayed, with a 
lack of tolerance or emotional response fueling an "instinct to 
punish or otherwise divert the jury from its task to determine the 
mental state of defendant at the time of the [incident]." Maurer, 
770 P.2d at 987. 
"[B]ecause of the inflammatory effect which the threat 
might have on the jury, it should not have been admitted." State v. 
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1989) (construing Marlar, 498 P.2d 
at 1283). Other evidence independent of the threats cannot save the 
conviction. Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1283. Debra Hodges's conviction 
should be reversed. Id.; see Maurer, 770 P.2d at 987. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED TESTIMONY FROM A 
"SURPRISE" STATE WITNESS NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO 
THE DEFENSE 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the supreme 
court expressed concern with a prosecution's response to a discovery 
request which may "misled-the-defense": 
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an incomplete response to a specific request not only 
deprives the defense of certain evidence, but has the 
effect of representing to the defense that the 
evidence does not exist. In reliance on this 
misleading representation, the defense might abandon 
lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial 
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued. 
We agree that the prosecutor's failure to respond 
fully to a . . . request may impair the adversary 
process in this manner. 
Knightf 734 P.2d at 917 (quoting United States v. Baqley, 473 U.S. 
667 (1985) (citations omitted)). 
In the present case, the record establishes that counsel 
for Ms. Hodges had requested the State to provide "A list of all the 
witnesses that the State intends to call for trial in the 
above-entitled matter, their addresses, telephone numbers and 
criminal records." (R 17-20); cf. Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (such 
requests "specifically and unmistakably [seek] disclosure of [Utah 
R. Crim. P. 16](a)(5) material consisting of the names and addresses 
of witnesses and their statements"); Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5) 
states, "Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defense upon request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge . . . any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense"). 
However, Ruth Ann Smith was never named as a State 
witness. She did not testify at the preliminary hearing and the 
State even acknowledged "that [Ms. Smith's] name was not furnished 
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to defense counsel prior to trial today because we didn't have it." 
(R 130, 139). While Ms. Smith's own testimony revealed that a 
subpoena prompted her appearance, (R 261) — a representation at 
odds with the State's claims, her impact on the trial was undeniable. 
Without Ms. Smith, the State had little more than a victim 
unsure in his identification, (R 151, 167); a neighbor's perception 
of the intruder's voice, "shape", and clothes, (R 179); and 
inadmissible allegations concerning death threats. See supra 
Point I. With Ms. Smith, the State now had a focus different from 
its pretrial presentation of witnesses, (R 139), its case-in-chief 
having changed without notice to suddenly emphasize a claimed 
accomplice who allegedly acted as a "lookout" for the burglary. The 
State's "eleventh-hour" witness severely hampered the defense's 
ability to prepare and counter such claims. Cf. Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 917 (quoting Baqley# 473 U.S. at 682 (having been misled, "the 
defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, 
or trial strategies that it otherwise would have pursued")). 
Counsel for Ms. Hodges attempted to mitigate the impact of 
the unexpected testimony by requesting a continuance, cf. State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990), but the trial 
court denied the request. (R 246). Ms. Hodges was left with little 
time to investigate Ruth Ann Smith's motivations for testifying, to 
uncover legitimate reasons other than her claim that she "can't have 
good recovery unless I'm [Smith] honest[,]" (R 258), or her denials 
that other prior arrests had affected her willingness to so readily 
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incriminate herself in the involved burglary, (R 257-58), or Smith's 
uncharacteristic sense of comfort with the prosecution, (R 246-47), 
one which a three time arrestee would not be expected to have. 
Unlike the situation in State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 
(Utah App. 1993), where this Court held "that the State was not 
precluded from calling a rebuttal witness not disclosed before trial 
in circumstances where it, in good faith, had no reason to expect 
the need for such witness before trial[,]" jLd. at 473 (emphasis 
added), the State's use here of a key witness should have been 
disclosed formally to Ms. Hodges because it expected or should have 
expected the need for her testimony, see State's Exhibit 1-S 
(Officer Arenaz's police report), prior to the morning of trial. 
The trial court's decision to allow Ms. Smith to testify should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Debra Hodges respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
her conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this QJ^ day of May, 1994. 
RCfN^ LD SAFd: ONA UJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
- 16 -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2*j day of May, 1994. 
DELIVERED by 
t h i s
 J2 T day of May, 19*4. 
- 17 -
ADDENDUM A 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded u its prooauve vmue i»
 suw. 
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
It may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.' 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
budding or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felonyTtheft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelhng, in which event it is a felony of the second decree. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A Derson commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
